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INTRODUCTION
The beginning of this Essay takes an unorthodox course. As a
starting point, I jump to the middle of my topic. I do so by telling a
story. Through this approach, borrowing a page from the style of
children’s stories and biblical text, I seek to simplify my task. The tale
I will relate is meant as an expression that sometimes, complex
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challenges are easier to explain and best understood when clarified
with plain illustrations. Graphic contrasts and allegorical aids open
lines to purpose and meaning. Casting things in a different light this
way can serve not only to gain clearer understanding, but to change
hearts and minds, and perhaps even catalyze sooner action in
response to a need or a cause.
The story occurred to me recently while reading a statement made
by a judge that contains an insightful comparison; one I think sheds
light on my thesis. The judge commented on the function of our
courts as the place to which people must sometimes resort in coping
with the countless acute afflictions of life, many of which involve
urgencies they, especially the poor, endure daily as they struggle to
satisfy basic human needs. In this connection, the judge said that
“[t]he courts are truly the emergency rooms of society.”1
That judicial metaphor is generally apt and should work well as
applied to most people. But, now vary the analogy. Change the
hospital emergency room by adjusting how it functions to reflect the
workings of the courthouse, focusing in particular on the realities
poor unrepresented parties encounter daily in our courts. What
would hospital patients experience if some of the treatment and
practices that poor people face in our justice system applied to
medical care as well? The new setting, even with its bizarre
distortion, is not hard to visualize. And the picture it would paint is
not pretty.
In the emergency room as imagined, two groups of patients—one
wealthy and one poor—enter presenting similarly serious wounds and
acute pains. The rich patients—those able to afford the full expense
of medical services—are sent to an intensive care unit for treatment
by certified physicians and trained nurses. The poor ones—those
possessing no means from any source to pay for doctors—are shunted
to a common waiting room. There they sit for hours until their names
are called, at which point they are handed a first-aid kit, an
abbreviated medical manual, and other self-help guides. The package
includes forms describing various common conditions by which the
patients might be able to identify what they feel and compare their
symptoms to those of known illnesses, and thus self-diagnose what
ails them. The kit also provides how-to instructions that the patients
can follow in operating the image scanning machines; pads on which
to write prescriptions for their own medications; and even simple

1. Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil Legal
Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 14 (2013).
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instruments with which to perform surgical procedures on themselves.
To handle extreme circumstances in which the poor patients
encounter exceptional difficulties employing this handy service, the
hospital maintains on standby duty a limited number of medical
students and nurse trainees to provide low-income patients some
basic guidance on the use of the various medical tools supplied to
them. Meanwhile, the hospital’s physicians, on the way from their
lounge to and from serving the paying patients, regularly pass by the
poor people’s waiting room.
Would the hospital trustees and administrators maintain a health
care system featuring the emergency room service this illustration
depicts? In our civilization, indisputably not. Indeed, even in the
world’s least progressive societies it would be derided as a travesty, a
mockery not only of health care standards, but of any measure of
human caring as well. Yet any judge would readily recognize a
parallel courthouse caricature.
To a judge watching litigants
represent themselves in a courtroom, the event often seems like the
justice system’s version of assisted suicide. The scene of self-help in
the courthouse is especially poignant at a trial or in complicated
proceedings in which the controlling legal issues lodge somewhere
within the arcana and long-studied subtleties of the law. The
experience could be every bit as disturbing and pitiable as it might be
to witness a hospital patient self-administering surgical aid.
If this hypothetical sounds too fanciful or far off the mark, think of
real cases taken from the courts’ dockets every day. Consider the
recent crisis in this country’s housing market brought about by
mortgage foreclosures. We know now that vast numbers of those
proceedings were basically flawed, if not recklessly fraudulent or
otherwise unlawful. Yet, in New York, in over 60% of the foreclosure
actions filed by the nation’s largest banks, homeowners were not
represented at a critical stage of the proceedings that the applicable
statute requires before a judge can grant relief.2 By contrast, the
banks appeared in court through specialized lawyers. Literally tens of
thousands of those individuals lost their homes improperly, and many
of them might have avoided that fate had they received adequate
legal assistance. How many of those families are now homeless, on
the streets, in shelters, or sharing overcrowded quarters with relatives
and friends? The same situation continues to play out daily in New
York City Housing Court. Every year, in hundreds of thousands of
2. See ANN PFAU, STATE OF N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2010 REPORT OF
CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS 11–12 (2010), available
http://www.nycourts.gov/publications/pdfs/foreclosurereportnov2010.pdf.
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eviction actions, over 95% of tenants appear in court as defendants
without a lawyer. Landlords represented by counsel confront these
tenants in almost all cases.3 Massive numbers of those poor tenants
end up homeless and cite eviction as the cause, while eviction ensues
in few of the cases in which they are assisted by a lawyer.4
Applying my own comparative scoring of the physical and
emotional pain levels people experience in a hospital and a
courthouse on a scale of one to ten, I would say that in many
circumstances the hurt ratings would at minimum coincide. For a
resident evicted from a home and thrown out onto the streets, for a
parent who loses custody of a child, for an elderly person who forfeits
health benefits or financial assistance—in each of these cases by lack
of legal aid in court proceedings instituted to curtail rights to basic
human needs—the outcome could feel as excruciating, and pierce as
deeply into the sinew and bone of daily life, as wounds inflicted by
bodily injury. The emotional distress and psychological aches these
unassisted parties suffer in the courthouse may be no less acute and
traumatic than the pain associated with many physical ailments for
which they can secure routine medical treatment in the emergency
room.
I. BACKGROUND
The hospital analogy in my Introduction can be brought closer to
home in court, as I will try to do later in my presentation through
another fable. For now, let us return to actual developments in the
real world of legal services for the poor. Earlier this year a spate of
articles appeared in the news media and in academic literature
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright.5
Much of the commentary focused on assessing whether the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in that case has achieved its full promise: the
constitutional right of indigents to representation of counsel in
criminal proceedings.6 Over time, the circumstances that compelled

3. See generally COMM. ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF N.Y., HOUSING COURT PRO BONO PROJECT: REPORT ON THE PROJECT, PARTS I
AND II (1988); THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y.,
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2010), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLSTaskForceREPORT.pdf (noting that 99% of tenants are unrepresented in eviction
cases in New York City).
4. See COMM. ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 11–13.
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-

2014]

THE SILENT MAJORITY

1321

Gideon—the denial of equal access to justice in our courts based on a
person’s inability to pay—has prompted examination of the same
fundamental issues as they relate to the civil justice system. Perhaps
the most prominent question in this debate is whether the time has
come for what is referred to as a “civil Gideon,” and how the courts
and members of the Bar should gear up to address both the
overwhelming need and the growing demand for legal services for
low-income persons in civil cases in view of the limited available
resources.
During the past twenty-five years, as this retrospective will
demonstrate, the New York State court system has been recognized
as a pioneer in addressing these issues. Working closely with New
York’s organized Bar, our State judicial officers and administrators
have led the way in calling attention to the legal needs of the poor, in
advocating for improvements in programs devoted to meeting those
needs, and in highlighting the public benefits and personal value that
lawyers, litigants, and the courts derive from pro bono and public
interest legal service. This Essay examines what New York has and
has not done in this sphere over this time span, the extent to which
the State’s efforts have and have not succeeded, and what more may
need to be done to realize better results. My thesis stresses a vital
point: the severe crisis that large numbers of unrepresented poor
people creates for our civil justice system, as well as for our larger
society, raises not only grave legal and administrative concerns, but
profoundly moral predicaments.
As an opening historical backdrop, I quote from statements made
by two New York State Chief Judges. In the spring of 1988, then
Chief Judge Sol Wachtler noted that “the growing need for providing
legal services to the poor has worsened.”7 He added that “[t]here has
been a disproportionate growth in the number of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law in relation to the number of people who are denied
effective access to the civil justice system in this state because of a
lack of means.”8 In early 2013, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman made
counsel-badly-battered-at-50.html?_r=0; Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the
Right to Counsel, 50 Years After ‘Gideon’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013, 11:09 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-tocounsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433/?single_page=true; Karen Houppert, Indigent
Clients Suffer as Public Defenders Struggle to Keep Up with Caseloads, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/legal-aid-for-indigentclients-needs-help/2013/03/15/65dcbe56-8cc9-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_story.html.
7. Victor Marrero et al., Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal
Services, Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 755, app. A at 852 (1990).
8. Id. at 763 (internal citation omitted).
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a similar observation. He wrote that “we are facing a crisis in the
delivery of justice in New York State . . . . There is a growing justice
gap between the dire need for civil legal services and the dwindling
resources available.”9
These comments were given twenty-five years apart by two New
York State Chief Judges, noting the existence of essentially the same
conditions challenging our civil justice system. In light of these
comments, when I was considering a subtitle for this Essay the first
idea that came to mind was “The More Things Change, The More
They Stay The Same.” Instead, I labeled it “The Silent Majority” for
reasons that will become clear in a moment. As a starting point, I
perceive that during this past quarter of a century, through the efforts
undertaken by courts and the organized Bar to expand legal services
available for civil litigants unable to afford counsel, some things
indeed have changed substantially. But others have remained at a
standstill, relatively unaffected despite the considerable public and
private energies and resources that have been expended to improve
access to the civil justice system.
To preface this part of my remarks, I acknowledge something that
has stayed the same over these years. This constant is embodied in
the remarkable leadership provided by three successive New York
State Chief Judges—Sol Wachtler, Judith Kaye, and Jonathan
Lippman—regarding the underlying access to justice issues. Each of
them has played an exceptional role in focusing the Bar’s attention on
what is referred to as the “justice gap,”10 a phenomenon also often
characterized as a “crisis” in civil justice in New York,11 and indeed in
many other parts of the country.12 Those terms encompass two
interrelated challenges. The first expresses a matter of quantity: the
vast number of civil litigants who appear in court proceedings every
day without assistance of counsel because they cannot afford to pay
for a lawyer. The second conveys a question of quality; there are
adverse consequences that unrepresented poor litigants in such
magnitude impose on the parties, the courts, the legal profession, and
the larger society. Each of these Chief Judges deserves recognition
and our gratitude for exercising the great authority and moral

9. Lippman, supra note 1, at 13.
10. Id.
11. See id.; see also THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS.
IN N.Y., supra note 3, at 1; Marrero et al., supra note 7, at 772.
12. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE 1 (2012),
available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/PBTF_%20Report_
FINAL.pdf.
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leadership of their high office to promote the public good, not only by
raising awareness of the existence of a large blight on our justice
system, but also by initiating creative ways to mitigate its harms. In
this ample tribute to judicial action I report the good news. I now
turn to chronicle the not so good—the reaction and inaction.
II. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
Regrettably, despite the commitment and best efforts of our Chief
Judges and courts, even combined with strong cooperation and
support from major segments of the organized Bar, the justice gap
persists in New York, its effects still as pernicious as ever. But while
the dimensions of the crisis have remained essentially the same in
some respects, in other ways they have gotten worse, significantly
altering the tenor and enlarging the implications of the underlying
problems for our justice system. A hard look at the twenty-five years
of experience examined here confirms this observation.
For
regardless of the many remedial efforts attempted by judges and the
organized Bar, the acute legal crisis engendered in our courts by the
overwhelming number of unrepresented poor litigants has festered.
As the hardships that low-income people encounter in our courts by
denial of effective access to justice have deepened, resulting legal and
social issues have assumed a higher grade of urgency.
Fifty-one years ago, President John F. Kennedy spoke to the nation
in a speech which still has resonance for the issues I present.13 He
addressed the inequality of treatment in civil rights African
Americans experienced under long-standing legal norms and social
practices that had developed in this country, conditions that had
become entrenched and intractable because they had been actively
observed and enforced, or condoned or ignored by many generations
of Americans.14 On this point, he described how on account of the
consequential injustices, the problem had intensified so as to decay
into what he characterized as a “moral crisis.”15 Those grave
injustices, which for centuries had been encoded or tolerated by much
of American society and still engraved in our collective conscience,
are now a thing of the past. They fell because our nation could no
longer accommodate a moral contradiction. The societal, moral, and
legal system that fostered those injustices eventually collapsed for the
13. See generally John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Radio and
Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9271.
14. See id.
15. Id.
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same reason that one hundred years earlier, as Abraham Lincoln had
foretold, the United States could not stand as a house divided against
itself. At neither of those historical crossroads could America live
with the discrepancy between what its people loftily professed on
paper and what they actually did on the ground, between the high
principles of human equality and equal justice our Constitution
proclaims as supreme law of the land, and an oppressive reality: the
virulent discrimination and rampant violence that a major part of the
American population endured because of the happenstance of race.
In a similar vein, a moral crisis, unsustainable under the weight of
equally powerful principles, permeates our civil justice system. The
grave imbalance of legal resources the poor contend with in civil
actions has deepened into crisis conditions that, in moral terms, we
should regard as ugly and unconscionable, and combat as vigorously
as those that defined and weakened this country during the centurieslong struggle of African Americans for equal rights. For, at bottom,
as was the case of the injustices prevailing in American society
generations ago, perhaps the worst outcome that the crisis of inequity
of civil justice presents to our generation is its constitutional
dimension. As a by-product of the enormous burdens the legal
services needs of unrepresented parties impose on our judicial system,
courts have become increasingly two-tiered. In essence, the price of
services in our judicial system has been marked up, and the caliber of
justice it renders has become more and more divided along economic
lines: one higher class of justice only accessible to the rich, and a
lesser one open to the poor.
To demonstrate the depth of the justice gap and how impervious to
improvement it has been over these twenty-five years, this Essay first
compares the unmet legal needs of the poor then and now. Next, this
Essay considers the prodigious efforts exerted by the Chief Judges,
the courts, and the organized Bar to improve the availability of legal
services for the poor. And then this Essay weighs that level of
commitment against the still modest results that such unwavering and
concentrated energies have produced.
In 1988, the New York State Bar Association undertook a survey
to measure the unmet needs for legal services experienced by poor
people in New York State.16 The study, first released in 1990,
documented the deeply troubling social and economic conditions
under which low-income New Yorkers lived, and how the dire effects

16. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM.
NEEDS STUDY (1993).

ON
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of those circumstances came to bear on our courts. Among its most
important contributions, the study documented the extensive
incidence of poverty in New York and its pronounced manifestation
in the justice system.17
Specifically, according to the study, approximately three million
people, or nearly 15% of the State’s 1987 population, lived on incomes
at or below the national poverty level (based on an index that then
stood at $11,700 per year for a family of four).18 The study also found
that households representing the State’s poor population reported an
average of 2.37 distinct civil legal problems—involving basic human
needs such as housing, employment, health, and parental rights—for
which the individuals had obtained no legal assistance during the
survey year.19 At the same time, federal, State, and local funding
available for civil legal services for the poor had experienced sharp
reductions. With all available public and private resources combined,
only about 14% of the overall legal needs of the poor were being
met.20
Skip forward twenty-five years to the most recent examinations of
the same conditions. A new legal needs survey was performed in
2010 by the Task Force to Expand Access to Civil Legal Services in
New York State,21 a group of prominent leaders of the New York
State Bar appointed by Chief Judge Lippman. The Task Force was
directed to measure the extent of the unmet civil legal services needs
of the poor, to propose statewide priorities, programs, strategies, and
best practices to improve the delivery of legal services in civil
proceedings, and to advocate for greater public funding to finance
legal services for the poor. In its needs analysis, the Task Force found
that among the working poor, defined as persons reporting incomes at
or below 200% of the federal poverty index (then approximately
$22,100 for a family of four), almost three million people had faced a
civil legal problem also involving fundamental human needs during
the study year.22 The Task Force’s report concluded that at most, 20%
of the needs of the State’s working poor for civil legal services were
being addressed.23 In concrete terms, these figures indicated that

17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. at 159–60.
21. See THE TASK FORCE
supra note 3.
22. Id. at 4, 11.
23. Id. at 4.
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every year more than 2.3 million low-income New Yorkers proceed
through the State’s civil justice system without legal assistance.24
Legal services providers confirm these figures. The Legal Aid
Society, for example, reported that in 2012 its offices turned away
nearly 90% of people who sought legal assistance.25
Thus, in nearly twenty-five years little changed in any of the major
social and court system indicators that measure the justice gap. The
number of people in the state classified as poor, the number of civil
legal problems low-income households encountered, and the number
of persons involved in court proceedings who experienced a need for
legal services but were unable to obtain assistance of counsel,
remained substantially unchanged. One telling statistic relevant to
this overview, however, did register a dramatic rise: in 1987,
approximately 110,000 attorneys were registered in New York State.26
The number in 2012 was approximately 280,000.27
Against these realities, no serious dispute could arise regarding
three issues. First, the vast unmet needs of poor people in New York
for legal services pertaining to basic human needs still persist in crisis
proportions. Second, the primary obligation to resolve the justice gap
and its impact on the legal system belongs to government at all levels.
And third, to fulfill this purpose, public financing of legal services
providers to employ trained, full-time lawyers is the most effective
solution, and should be the first-line strategy for both government
and the organized Bar to pursue. I will not dwell further on these
points except to note that the mere existence of the justice gap, with
its long duration and overwhelming proportions, constitutes ample
evidence of the continuing inadequacy of the governmental response,
and of the dim prospects that change will emerge from that front
anytime soon.
What does constitute the subject of great debate within the legal
community regarding the scope of justice gap presents a different
question. Assuming both the persistence of the enormous unmet
need for legal services for the poor, the considered ongoing shortage
of governmental resources, and the unpromising future for
24. See id.
25. John Caher, Hearing Begins Evaluation of Need for More Civil Legal
Services, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2013, www.legal-aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/
inthenews/newyorklawjournalreportsonchiefjudgelippmanshearings.aspx.
26. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 10TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR 102 (1988).
27. E-mail from Sam Younger, Deputy Dir., N.Y. Office of Court Admin., to
Hon. Victor Marrero, Senior Judge, S.D.N.Y. (June 25, 2013) (on file with author)
(citing numbers from an internal report not published).
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improvement on this score, what are individual members of the Bar
now doing or not doing about these worsening conditions and their
impacts on the justice system? Should lawyers bear an obligation to
do more?
III. THE FIRE NEXT D OOR: FROM LEGAL CRISIS TO MORAL
CRISIS
As a point of departure for a review of what exists and what
remains to be done about the justice gap, recall the lofty exhortation
enshrined in the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional
Responsibility.28 Preceding the text of Ethical Canon 2-34 is a
statement that “a lawyer has a professional obligation to render
public interest and pro bono legal service.”29 The pro bono
contributions contemplated by this provision are defined broadly to
include legal services at no fee and without expectation of a fee to: (1)
persons of limited financial means; (2) not-for-profit, governmental or
public services organizations, where the legal services are designed
primarily to address the legal and other basic needs of persons of
limited financial means; or (3) organizations specifically designed to
increase the availability of legal services to persons of limited means.30
As a numerical goal, the number of hours of pro bono and public
interest legal service that each lawyer should aspire to provide was
recently raised from twenty to fifty.31 To assess how well members of
the Bar have fared over the past twenty-five years in achieving these
ethical standards, I return to some important developments set in
motion in 1988.
A. The Picture Then
In 1988, then-New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler observed
that the problems associated with the unmet needs of the State’s poor
population for legal services had worsened. In response, he noted
that public attention had increasingly focused on the obligation of the
private Bar to provide legal representation on behalf of people who

28. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, NEW YORK LAWYER’S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (2007), available at http://www.nysba.org//workarea/downloadasset.
aspx?id=26638.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id.
31. Joel Stashenko & Christine Simmons, Court System Enacts Disclosure
Mandate for Pro Bono Service, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 2013, at 1,
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202598312375.
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needed such services but were unable to afford them.32 To examine
the issues he appointed the Committee to Improve the Availability of
Legal Services (the CIALS). The CIALS, which I had the honor and
privilege to chair, was composed of leaders of the Bar drawn from
every part of New York State. As the Chief Judge spelled out, the
CIALS’s mission was to develop a plan of action comprising
programs and methods necessary to provide increased legal services
to the poor by attorneys in New York through their involvement “in
the discharge of their fundamental and ethical responsibilities as
members of the Bar.”33 In particular, Chief Judge Wachtler’s charge
provided, “Deliberations of the committee may also include
consideration of the propriety and feasibility of imposing a mandatory
pro bono obligation on all members of the bar . . . .”34
The CIALS’s work spanned more than two years. Its methods
included consultations with legal services providers, bar associations,
and law schools, as well as public hearings throughout the State
designed to elicit views from members of the organized Bar and
community leaders. The CIALS then presented its Final Report to
the Chief Judge in April 1990.35 In it, the CIALS made the following
findings and recommendations: (1) the unmet need for civil legal
services for the poor in New York constituted a critical problem
having a devastating impact on the lives of large numbers of poor
people who needed legal assistance and could not afford to pay for a
lawyer; (2) the problem posed severe implications for the legitimacy
of the State’s legal profession and justice system; (3) the problem had
to be addressed promptly through the efforts of society in general and
members of the legal profession; (4) whether or not society
responded, lawyers have a separate professional responsibility to
contribute meaningfully to remedy the problem; and (5) the scope of
the need was so extensive that volunteer efforts alone could not
provide an adequate response.36 The CIALS proposed a plan calling
for obligatory pro bono legal services that it considered essentially
sound and more responsive to the crisis than either the volunteerism
alternative boosted by opponents, or inaction.37

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Marrero et al., supra note 7, app. A at 852.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 768.
See id.
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A Plan of Action . . .

The CIALS’s far-reaching pro bono services proposal
recommended that the State court system adopt a rule that would
obligate all practicing attorneys in New York, as a condition of
remaining in good standing as members of the State’s bar, to perform
a minimum of twenty hours every year of qualifying legal services.38
As defined by the CIALS plan, qualifying services would include
three primary categories: (1) professional services in civil matters
rendered directly to persons who cannot afford to compensate
counsel; (2) activities designed to improve the administration of
justice and access to justice for poor persons; and (3) professional
services to charitable, religious, civic, or educational organizations in
matters related primarily to addressing the needs of poor persons.39
A word about nomenclature. This proposal is of course known in
the vernacular as “mandatory pro bono,” a somewhat unfortunate
misnomer. Combined, the terms border on the linguistic absurd
somewhere along the lines of oxymoron, epithet, and call to arms. As
such, the phrase must have been the branding brainchild of someone
challenged in communications and marketing skills, or a stroke of
genius of a rabid opponent of the idea. Better articulated, what the
concept really embodies is a fulfillment of pro bono legal service, a
public interest requirement that attorneys must satisfy annually as a
condition of remaining as members of the New York Bar in good
standing, and thus fulfilling the duties and enjoying the rewards of the
profession.

2.

. . . And Reaction

Response to the CIALS’s pro bono obligation proposal was mixed.
It was supported by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, the largest organized Bar group in the State, as well as by some
of the leading legal services providers and advocates, among them the
Legal Aid Society, Community Action for Legal Services, Volunteers
for Legal Services, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, and the
Council of Law Associates. The concept also received substantial
editorial endorsement, including from The New York Times.40 It was

38. See id. (stating the proposed requirement as forty hours of qualifying pro
bono legal services every two years).
39. Id. at 768–69.
40. See Kevin Sack, Chief Judge Presses Lawyers on Legal Work for the Poor,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/02/nyregion/chief-judgepresses-lawyers-on-legal-work-for-the-poor.html.
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opposed by the New York State Bar Association and several county
bar associations.
Among the critics’ most frequent objections, one merits mention
here because it directly squares with the legal and moral issues which
remain at the heart of the legal community’s continuing debate about
the subject. Opponents pointed out that the problems created by the
unmet needs of the poor for legal services involved issues for which
society as a whole bore the responsibility and which could be solved
properly only through allocation of adequate public resources.41
Accordingly, they further argued that it was unfair to single out
lawyers to bear an obligation not imposed on any other licensed
professions and that legal services contributions made by volunteers
should not be compelled.42
To these arguments, the response that CIALS members found
most persuasive relied on constitutional and ethical concepts. The
right to assistance of counsel and the fair and effective administration
of justice regardless of a person’s financial means are bedrock
principles enshrined in our constitutional government, and, at least in
spirit, are also reflected in the Lawyer’s Code of Professional
Responsibility. As officers of the court, attorneys solemnly take a
professional oath to honor and support those basic tenets. The
ethical canon which provides for the lawyer’s professional obligation
to render public interest and pro bono legal service does not refer to
mere charity applicable to all persons in general, but to a form of duty
particular to attorneys that stems from and is integral to their special
public role in our society.
Because of the solid constitutional and public interest
underpinnings upon which legal services in our courts are grounded,
the lawyer’s function is unique among licensed professions. The
success or failure of our justice system thus depends vitally on the
effective performance of attorneys’ duties and on the level of their
contributions to strengthen the administration of justice. The
Constitution does not confer that lofty societal status on any other
profession. It makes no reference to the services of doctors, teachers,
or plumbers, for example. Accordingly, legal services stand quite
apart from those provided by many other professional endeavors, and
rest on a higher public plane. From this perspective, to equate an
attorney’s obligation to provide pro bono assistance to the poor in
furtherance of the fair and effective administration of justice with
41. See Steven Wechsler, Attorneys’ Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 909, 926 (1990).
42. See id.
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work performed by other professionals is to devalue the meaning of
the lawyer’s public interest function in our society.
Chief Judge Wachtler, acknowledging the divisions within the Bar,
accepted the CIALS Final Report but deferred consideration of the
pro bono service proposal.43 Noting that the State Bar Association
had committed to redouble its efforts to significantly increase the
legal services available to the poor by means of a comprehensive
program of voluntary actions, Chief Judge Wachtler agreed to allow
the Bar leaders two years to demonstrate the results of those
initiatives.44 But, he cautioned that if those efforts were not successful
after the two-year period, he would seek implementation of the pro
bono service condition recommended by the CIALS.45
The State Bar Association then launched an ambitious statewide
campaign to mobilize attorneys to increase the level of volunteer legal
services provided to the poor, using the CIALS definition as a
benchmark. Its ambitious twenty-point program touched every
corner of the legal community and included initiatives of education,
exhortation, advertising, recognition, encouragement, training, and
coordination of pro bono activities. The Association published its
report of these efforts in February 1994.46
Meanwhile, to monitor the results of the State Bar Association’s
program, Chief Judge Wachtler appointed a Pro Bono Review
Committee and named Justin Vigdor (a past President of the New
York State Bar Association) and myself to serve as co-chairs. That
committee conducted three annual surveys and presented its Final
Report to Chief Judge Wachtler’s successor, Judith Kaye, in April
1994.47

3.

Inaction: The Silent Majority

The Pro Bono Review Committee’s findings were not encouraging.
Over the three-year survey period, nearly half of the members of the
New York Bar indicated that they did not engage in any activity

43. Sol Wachtler, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, Introduction, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 739, 743 (1991).
44. Id. at 742–43.
45. Id. at 743.
46. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE & THE DEP’T OF PRO BONO
AFFAIRS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, NEW YORK EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE UNMET
NEEDS OF THE STATE’S POOR, SEPTEMBER, 1991 TO DECEMBER, 1993 (1994).
47. VICTOR MARRERO ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRO BONO REVIEW
COMMITTEE (1994).
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providing pro bono legal services of any kind.48 The percentage of
attorneys providing any amount of qualifying pro bono services to
poor persons actually declined slightly over three years—from 39.8%
of those surveyed in 1990 to 37.7% in 1992.49 Of respondents who did
participate in such services, only 21% met the twenty-hour annual
standard proposed by the CIALS.50 But the total number of hours of
qualifying services provided individually by attorneys who did
contribute increased on average from 36.5 hours in 1990 to 44.0 hours
in 1992.51
Considering the State Bar Association’s ambitious
commitment to raise volunteerism, the results were less than
promising. Only 10% of respondents reported participating in
qualifying service for the first time in 1992, and only 3.6% indicated
that their initial response followed the pro bono volunteer activities
promoted by the organized Bar.52 Ninety percent of contributors
reported that they had provided pro bono legal services in the past.53
From these results, several reasonable inferences and implications
follow. First, assuming these statistics continue to hold today, the
analysis suggests that approximately 75% to 80% of the members of
the Bar fail to meet the goal of twenty hours of pro bono services
relating to the unmet legal needs of the poor. Second, essentially the
same overall percentage of lawyers—the same minority of the whole
Bar—has traditionally volunteered in response to the dire need of the
poor for legal services and the related crisis in the justice system.
And third, significantly, the contributions by those attorneys who do
participate in pro bono and public interest service have not been
static. Apparently, those lawyers have increased their professional
commitment, providing more pro bono assistance at the same time as
the unmet needs of the poor for legal services grew and as the Chief
Judges and Bar leaders sounded the clarion call seeking more
volunteers to help.

4.

Keeping the Light Flickering

To round out this historical sketch, a few more key events merit
reference. Viewed as a whole, these developments underscore the

48. Id. at 23; see also JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYS., THE FUTURE OF PRO BONO IN NEW YORK, VOL. TWO: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PRO BONO CONVOCATIONS 5 (2004).
49. MARRERO ET AL., supra note 47, at 15.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 47.
53. Id. at 14, 15, 20, 24, 47.
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same three points: that the State court system has been constantly
mindful of the justice gap; that its high-level efforts to address the
crisis have been continuous; and that the level of lawyers’ volunteer
contributions of legal services has remained relatively unchanged, and
has fallen far short of the amount necessary to narrow the justice gap
in any meaningful way.
In 1997, Chief Judge Kaye and the Administrative Board of the
New York State Courts, responding to a proposal from the New York
City Bar Association, adopted a Pro Bono Resolution urging
attorneys to provide twenty hours of qualifying pro bono service
annually as defined by the CIALS proposal and to contribute
financial support for the work of organizations devoted to rendering
legal services for the poor.54 Starting then, a copy of the Pro Bono
Resolution was included with the registration forms that the state
court system biennially sends to all attorneys admitted to practice in
New York.
In 2002, responding to an initiative of Chief Judge Kaye and Chief
Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman, the State’s Unified Court
System conducted another survey of the amount of pro bono legal
services members of the State Bar performed related to the legal
needs of the poor. The study, which used the twenty-hour-per-year
goal the Administrative Board recommended in the 1997 Pro Bono
Resolution, indicated that 46% of practicing attorneys provided some
qualifying pro bono service while a majority—54%—made no pro
bono contribution of any kind.55 Moreover, of the attorneys who
contributed pro bono services, only about 27% performed more than
the recommended twenty hours per year.56 In fact, the levels of
participation by New York lawyers in pro bono activities had not
changed dramatically from those recorded by the Pro Bono Review
Committee ten years earlier, with one exception that reaffirmed the
findings of the earlier survey: the portion of volunteer attorneys who
did perform pro bono legal services and who satisfied the twenty-hour
per year CIALS standard, roughly the same 20% to 25% of the Bar,
continued to do so in approximately the same amounts of about fortyone hours per year.57

54. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., PRO BONO RESOLUTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARD
OF
THE
COURTS
(1997),
available
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/attorneys/probono/resolution.shtml.
55. KAYE & LIPPMAN, supra note 48, at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 26 n. 54.
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Two years later, New York’s Unified Court System organized four
Pro Bono Convocations throughout the State.
This initiative
reflected a continuation of Chief Judge Kaye’s efforts to promote
greater awareness of the unmet needs of poor people for legal
services. The report and recommendations of the Convocations was
published in January 2004.58 In brief, the Convocations, citing the
unmet legal needs study of the New York State Bar Association as
revised in 1993,59 made several general findings: (1) a need existed to
increase pro bono services in New York State; (2) formal statewide
programs to promote pro bono were necessary and desirable; (3) all
stakeholders should be involved in such activities; (4) the judiciary
should have a significant role, but local leadership, design,
implementation, and control of the tasks were essential to achieve a
comprehensive and workable program; and (5) pro bono services
should be voluntary.60
B.

The Picture Now

The preceding overview brings us to the present and leaves an
open question to guide the inquiry as it proceeds. Where does the
level of pro bono legal services provided by attorneys in New York
stand today in terms of both the overall level of lawyer participation
and the average number of hours contributed by each member of the
Bar? The short answer to this question is that at this time, no hard
measures exist more recently than in the twenty-year-old Pro Bono
Review Committee surveys and the 2002 update prepared by the
Unified Court System in connection with the 2004 Pro Bono
Convocations.
Several initiatives recently instituted by Chief Judge Lippman,
however, may soon provide a means to obtain a fresh indicator of the
New York Bar’s current pro bono participation.61 Those efforts were
58. See id.
59. See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. ON LEGAL AID, THE LEGAL
NEEDS STUDY (1993).
60. See KAYE & LIPPMAN, supra note 48, at 15.
61. Chief Judge Lippman, consistent with a recommendation by the Task Force
2010 Report, obtained approval to increase from $12.5 million to $25 million the
State judiciary’s funding for civil legal services for poor persons. See N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYS., BUDGET: GENERAL STATE CHARGES: FISCAL YEAR APRIL 1,
2012–MARCH 31, 2013, at 132 (2011), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
admin/financialops/BGT12-13/Final-GSC-Budget_2012-13.pdf. Other activities that
the Chief Judge and the State court system carried out for these purposes included:
the Attorney Emeritus Program, which seeks to encourage retired attorneys in good
standing to provide, through qualified legal services organizations, at least thirty
hours of services as pro bono counsel to low-income clients, see Jonathan Lippman,
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designed to narrow the justice gap by raising both public funding to
legal services organizations and the level of volunteer pro bono
contributions by members of the Bar. Among them, two are most
significant for the purposes of this subject. One is the adoption of a
rule requiring law school graduates to complete fifty hours of
participation in qualifying law-related pro bono work as a condition
of admission to law practice in New York.62 The second entails a
mandatory reporting requirement by which attorneys will indicate on
their biennial registration forms the number of hours of pro bono
legal services they provided during the preceding two years related to
the legal services needs of the poor.63

1.

A New Benchmark

The pro bono reporting rule went into effect in May 2013 and has
particular relevance to this discussion.64 The results from the first
evaluation of the reporting requirement could make available useful
updated information about how many, and in what amount, New
York attorneys are honoring their ethical obligation to provide pro
bono and public interest legal service. The shame or guilt, and
perhaps even a do-good inducement, associated with this requirement
could also potentially create a new incentive for lawyers who are not
making any pro bono contributions to do so for mandatory reporting
purposes. I anticipate that when the numbers are disclosed, an
important public debate will ensue about their meaning and
implications. In that respect, essential questions and concerns, as well
as pitfalls, will arise that any new review should address. Here I
suggest some of the major issues that those discussions should
consider, and a framework for analysis of the underlying issues.
I pause at this point to express a disclaimer followed by a word of
caution. I do not wish to prejudge the outcomes that the pro bono
reporting requirement may produce, nor do I want to appear unduly
New Attorney Emeritus Program is Announced, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 2010,
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202439358963/-New-Attorney-EmeritusProgram-Is-Announced; the appointment of a committee to study the feasibility of
permitting non-lawyers to provide assistance to the poor in simple civil matters, see
Joel Stashenko, Non-Lawyers May Get Role in Closing New York’s “Justice Gap,”
N.Y. L.J., May 30, 2013, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202601857889; and
an increase from twenty to fifty hours in the annual pro bono legal services goal
applicable to all Bar members, see Stashenko & Simmons, supra note 31.
62. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2013).
63. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 118(e)(14) (2013).
64. See Pro Bono Reporting Requirements—Attorney Registration, N.Y.
COURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/attorneys/probono/reportingreqs-intro.shtml (last
visited Mar. 15, 2014).
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skeptical of what the numbers will reveal about New York lawyers’
responses to any new pro bono services survey based on that
mandate. But, there are indicators that could offer predictions of
what the results might show. In some of the states in which the court
system imposed such a reporting requirement, lawyers’ declarations
indicated an increase in the total amount of pro bono activities. In
Illinois, for example, as Chief Judge Lippman’s Task Force 2010
Report points out,65 the pro bono hours lawyers reported rose by
about 10% after the rule went into effect. Nonetheless, before Bar
and court officials draw any hard conclusion from the reports or
formulate an official policy response, they should carefully analyze
and consider the reports’ statistical significance.

2.

Amber Light

At the risk of sounding too much like a spoilsport—the Grinch who
stole New York lawyers’ pro bono reporting celebration before it
happened—I will play a dual role at this juncture: as devil’s advocate
and as prophet. For the purposes of the first part, I will assume that
the most encouraging results emerge from a new survey of voluntary
pro bono contribution by New York lawyers, that the reporting
requirement will demonstrate a rise in participation of say 10% or
even 20%. As heartening as such numbers might appear at first
glance, the outcome would still raise issues that merit closer scrutiny
and counsel amber light precaution. In this regard, the weightiest risk
we must guard against is the rush to judgment, the temptation to
celebrate statistics prematurely and, regarding ongoing pro bono
efforts, deciding that even a modest improvement is good enough.
Here I will switch professional garb from devil’s advocate and don
the robe of fortuneteller. I would venture a prediction that in the
debate about what the reporting requirement results indicate there
will be a contingent, possibly comprising a substantial proportion of
the members of the Bar, who, if the results show some increase in pro
bono activities, will reject the cautionary approach I propose.
Instead, buoyed and relieved by the numbers, their likely impulse will
be euphoria—grounds to advocate for an immediate official
pronouncement that the outcome is acceptable, so as to enable the
New York Bar to declare victory and go home. But, however
exhilarated lawyers may feel by any such exciting early returns,
another side in that debate should be heard, and forthrightly weighed.

65. See generally THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS.
supra note 3.

IN N.Y.,
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I would again advise against hasty retreat from a future course aimed
at expanding contributions of pro bono legal services universally and
apportioning more equitably the Bar members’ unique responsibility
in efforts aimed at closing the justice gap and relieving the crisis in
our courts. Before jumping to conclusions regarding the meaning of
lawyers’ reports about their pro bono contributions, the legal
community should ensure that we possess a sufficiently reliable
analytic framework to support any policy response. What the
circumstances may demand and justify as a proper next step for the
court system to follow should be both principled and based on
defensible data.
In line with my continuing role here as constructive critic, I suggest
several fundamental issues that a thorough examination of the
reporting requirement results should consider. At the outset, it is
important to bear in mind that the reporting system incorporates
several built-in limitations that could produce substantial
overstatement of pro bono legal services. It employs self-reports. For
that reason alone, such representations should be accorded
heightened scrutiny.66 Indeed, judges regularly admonish juries
66. The use of self-reports as sources of data for empirical research and
administrative purposes suffers from obvious shortcomings. In scientific studies that
rely heavily on investigation based on self-report questionnaires, researchers
customarily acknowledge the obvious limitations of results produced by the method.
See generally Rob Hoskin, The Dangers of Self-Report, SCI. FOR ALL BRAINWAVES
(Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.sciencebrainwaves.com/uncategorized/the-dangers-of-selfreport. The tendency of respondents to exaggerate or minimize answers because of
personal biases, fear of public embarrassment or incrimination, and/or the influence
of other self-interests, works to diminish the accuracy and reliability of information
gathered by self-reports.
The federal income tax system provides an instructive example of the
substantial rate of error self-reporting procedures generate, even in connection with a
mandatory public obligation subject to enforcement through severe penalties. For
2006, the most recent year for which public records are available, the Internal
Revenue Service reported a gross tax gap (the difference between taxes owed and
taxes paid on time) of $450 billion, of which approximately 84% represented underreported tax liability. See James M. Bickley, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42739, TAX
GAP, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1–2
(2012). Of the portion of income under-reported, 56% was attributable to taxpayers
who directly reported in their tax returns various sources of income not subject to
withholding, in contrast to only 1% in relation to income reported by employers to
the IRS from which taxes were withheld. In 2012, the random audits of individual
returns that the IRS performed resulted in no change in tax liability in 10% of
examinations conducted in person and no change in 15% of those done by mail.
Presumably, therefore, the IRS found under-reporting and imposed additional tax
liability on a significant number of audited returns. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 55B, DATA
BOOK 2012, at 23 (2012). Finally, in the criminal investigations the IRS conducted for
tax reporting violations, the resulting rate of conviction was 93%. See IRS
OVERSIGHT BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2012, at 36, 40 (2013).
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weighing potentially self-serving testimony of interested witnesses.
Caution is indicated here for numerous other reasons. The responses
are not confidential and would be measured against a defined goal of
voluntary activities. No audits or sanctions follow up on the reports,
and no consequences flow from failure to satisfy the new fifty-hour
aspirational standard. Thus, no means exist to check the filing of false
or exaggerated information. Because the identity of the reporting
attorneys would be shown in the registration forms, and potentially
subject to public disclosure, lawyers’ awareness that a name is linked
to the disclosure, combined with the other considerations described
above, could induce substantially enhanced reports.
On the other hand, if any new survey of pro bono activities bears
relation to reality and reflects previous patterns, another outcome,
one consistent with a vital component of the level of pro bono legal
services measured in the prior surveys, is likely to recur. Any real
bump recorded in the total amount of pro bono contributions
attorneys report is likely to derive disproportionately from the same
minority of New York Bar members who traditionally have
participated in pro bono activities. In view of these shortcomings,
assessment of the reporting requirement should factor in a reliable
margin of error. This measure would recognize that under these
circumstances the amount of pro bono services lawyers report
represents not hard truth, but an approximation, and thus that proper
adjustment should be made in the analysis so that the recognized
results project not a flawed representation, but the closest possible
embodiment of reality.
A second line for further examination in this endeavor should
consider both the starting point for measurement and the prevailing
conditions against which progress should be evaluated. Stated
another way, any appraisal of impacts and effectiveness of the levels
of individual and total pro bono activities that lawyers report should
be examined in relation to the scope of current total legal services
needs and the remedial impacts all existing resources are now making.
To aid this review, several questions merit consideration. Assuming
the reports indicate some rise in the amount of pro bono services
attorneys are contributing, what is the proper baseline? How many
and which lawyers are doing how much? What does any incremental
rise in the level of pro bono participation actually mean to the unmet
needs of the poor and to the courts? In other words, does any higher
amount of reported pro bono services translate into material
improvement of conditions on the ground, in the courts, and in the
overall dimensions of the justice gap? Or, given the magnitude and
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gravity of prevailing conditions, would any such increase still make
only a nominal difference in the grand scheme of things?
Returning to my Cassandra role, I now elaborate on, and warn
against, what I perceive as a prospect very likely to flow from the
initial results of the pro bono reporting requirement, and why
cautious examination of them matters so much. This forecast is based
on responses to reports of prior efforts to measure lawyers’ pro bono
participation levels, specifically the pro bono activities reported in the
surveys conducted by the Pro Bono Review Committee from 1990 to
1992 and by the Unified Court System in 2002. Recall the most
salient findings suggested by those studies. To the extent members of
the New York Bar provided pro bono or public interest legal services,
their overall response derived from less than 50% of the lawyers, and
not more than about 25% of them satisfied the annual twenty-hour
minimum suggested by the CIALS in 1990 and the 1997 Pro Bono
Resolution.67 The balance, over 50% of Bar members, performed
either less than the aspirational goal or no pro bono or public interest
legal services at all. In essence, for many of the non-participating
attorneys, the moral obligation for which the language of the
Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility’s EC 2-34 strives may
as well be, to use common legal jargon, supernumerary surplusage
signifying nothing about which Bar members should be seriously
concerned.
Yet, in response to reports of the results of the previous pro bono
surveys it is not uncommon to find members of the organized Bar
focusing their attention on the rise in the total amount of legal
services provided collectively by all attorneys and touting the higher
average number of hours per year individual attorneys contributed.
That response ignores two important points: that on closer analysis, as
a percentage of the whole the number of attorneys contributing pro
bono did not change, and that the increase in the number of hours
reported was largely attributable to the same participating minority.

3.

Sooner Action and Why It Matters

In response to the challenge and the course my admonitions
suggest, some representatives of the silent majority probably would
react aggressively. They might declare: so what? And they would
remind us that nothing in the law says that they are under any binding
obligation to do anything about the justice gap. True enough. So why
should their absence from the pro bono honor rolls matter? To

67. See generally N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., supra note 54.
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whom should it make a difference that a substantial majority of the
members of the Bar remains on the sidelines while a legal crisis
continues to diminish our justice system and while the entire weight
of efforts to relieve the shortfall continues to land on essentially the
same relatively small proportion of New York lawyers?
I would go further and pose perhaps the most provocative question
this line of inquiry suggests. Assume that the larger society,
expressing itself through official budgetary and political policies,
chooses to disregard the justice system’s pleas for adequate resources
and also ignores warnings of the consequences, and continues to
shortchange legal services, producing an ever wider and deeper
justice gap. When that event comes to pass—as in fact it has in New
York, as reflected by the unmet legal services needs of the poor in our
courts during at least the past twenty-five years—why should a larger
share of responsibility and a greater contribution for remedying the
accompanying problems not be demanded of all lawyers admitted to
practice in New York? Why should a more rigorous obligation for
safeguarding the fundamental ethical and legal values of fairness and
equal access to justice not be imposed on all members of the Bar by
the authorized court administrators?
A comparable line of inquiry would apply, and indeed its moral
crossroad has been encountered, in other contexts. Suppose jury
service, or paying taxes, or military service in time of war, were
voluntary and, even as vital public functions and societal structures
began to break down, not more than 25% of the citizenry, drawn
disproportionately from the same social or economic ranks, chose to
honor their moral obligation and participate fully in official calls for
contributions? Would a rule requiring universal participation not be
justified?
Admittedly, under the existing law, there is no legal answer to
these questions. In Turner v. Rogers,68 the Supreme Court recently
declined to rule that a constitutional right exists under the Due
Process Clause to compel court appointment of counsel in civil cases
for litigants who cannot afford a lawyer, even in a contempt
proceeding in which the offender faces a penalty of imprisonment.
And, of course, the provisions of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 2-34 represent merely aspirational goals. At this
time, the Bar’s efforts to generate a more effective answer to the
questions raised here must depend largely on two recourses. One is
to wait for a major change in existing law, potentially adopted by

68. 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011).
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decision of the United States Supreme Court or the New York Court
of Appeals, or by State statute or amendment of the canons of ethics,
to make the pro bono service standard prescribed by EC 2-34
obligatory at least in some circumstances. A second approach is for
the courts and the organized Bar to continue on the present course.
To that end they would continue to press for the miracle of a stronger
voluntary pro bono response by lawyers, self-motivated and
emanating from moral grounds, unsatisfactory as the Bar’s pro bono
performance record has been to date in relying primarily on the force
generated by this domain.
Despite the broad reach of the challenge I pose, I consider myself a
realist. I recognize that, regrettably, at this time efforts to produce a
more effective answer by the legislature, the courts, and the Bar to
the questions I raise are likely to be long term. That prospect creates
a period of continuing uncertainty, one of those long pauses that
induce doubt. Like a moment evoking a sense of waiting for Godot, it
asks: what happens in the meantime?

4.

Fighting the Fire

What I see likely to happen next is that, absent a more effective
and more immediate response from the court system, the justice gap
and its attendant moral crisis will continue getting worse. To
demonstrate my prediction, I turn again to the instructive aid of
another allegorical tale—as promised, one closer to the home front.
The courthouse is on fire, presenting a major crisis for the judges,
the lawyers, the litigants, and the administration of justice in the
State. The magnitude of the problem is staggering. The building is
far too big, the fire too extensive, and the potential loss of lives and
property too great for the firefighters available. The existing force
can provide only a fraction of the vast resources needed to handle the
emergency effectively. To save the historic structure, the fire
commissioner asks the court system for help in mobilizing volunteers.
The Chief Judge declares an emergency and puts out a call urging all
lawyers to lend a hand. A substantial number, say nearly 50%,
promptly respond with contributions in varying amounts varyingly
helpful to the rescue efforts. Some assist the firefighters in pulling the
hoses. Some join in relay teams passing buckets of water. Some send
money to aid the victims and help pay for restoration of the building.
As the threat intensifies, the Chief Judge seeks to fill the dire
shortage of resources by drafting law students and enlisting voluntary
support from retired lawyers and members of the general public.
These recruits are asked to perform non-hazardous but nonetheless
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important remedial tasks. Meanwhile, a substantial majority of the
members of the Bar, though sworn as officers of the court and by
virtue of the profession’s ethical canons morally bound to help, ignore
the crisis and pay no heed to the Chief Judge’s entreaties. In fact they
do nothing. Even as the flames spread and engulf the courthouse and
imperil the integrity of the profession, they watch in silence, hands in
their pockets, pails of water idle at their feet. When they do open
their mouths to speak, it is merely to remind the Chief Judge that,
unfortunate as the reality may seem, extinguishing the fire and
repairing the courthouse are not the problems of lawyers alone, but
rather public responsibilities the government should impose on the
whole society. The Chief Judge, as guardian of cherished values the
justice system proclaims and as keeper of the ethical standards
governing the Bar, possesses authority to act decisively in this
emergency. How should the Chief Judge respond?
This vignette represents an expression of how I, and possibly other
members of the CIALS, perceived the legal and moral crises
confronting New York’s justice system and the members of the Bar
twenty-five years ago when Chief Judge Wachtler charged our
committee to examine the problem. As it relates to legal services for
the poor, the ethical dilemma the tale poses should not be hard to
recognize. In any candid picture of our justice system, the story
captures substantially how the threat occasioned by the justice gap
and the corresponding challenge appeared then, and how the same
conditions still appear today.
The hypothetical also reveals a paradox. The moral crisis created
by the unmet legal services needs of the poor intensifies in direct
relation to introduction of less desirable remedies while more
effective means to address the demand are available but withheld or
exempt from deployment. The ethical complications become more
profound as long as a substantial portion of the Bar disregards or
tolerates urgent conditions in the justice system, leaving harms
unremedied while the severity of the underlying emergency continues
to worsen.69
Specifically, in evaluating the moral implications associated with
the unmet legal services needs, several considerations bear decisive
weight. First, the same relatively small percentage of volunteer
attorneys, a minority of all the members of the Bar, not only
continues to shoulder the entire burden of the private Bar’s response,
but is constantly called upon to contribute even more. Second, the

69. See discussion infra Part III.B.5.
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court system’s efforts to address the problem forces it to resort, as it
has in New York and elsewhere, to the aid of clearly valuable but not
optimal alternative resources, such as retired lawyers, students, and
general public volunteers.
Third, meanwhile, a vast multitude of lawyers who possess the
requisite training, experience, and resources—and whose
contributions would enable the court system to make a truly
substantial difference in alleviating the crisis—remain unresponsive
on the sidelines, protesting stronger calls for their assistance, and
disclaiming responsibility for contributing anything to help. Fourth,
these holdouts, by virtue of the license the State grants them to
practice law, are empowered to serve as officers of the court, and also
are enabled to earn a decent living and enjoy high social standing in
their communities. These lawyers would do well to recognize that a
scorched courthouse represents a moral failure that ultimately leaves
them a lesser place in which to ply their trade, and that their inaction
contributes to generating a justice system whose legitimacy is
threatened and a profession whose stature is correspondingly
diminished.

5.

The Most Fundamental Issue

As I perceive it, the moral crisis I describe has worsened because
something else—a weight that tipped the balance—decidedly
changed. At some grade of severity, the combination of these
increasingly urgent and unremedied circumstances sets in motion on a
larger scale a variable that underpins the most vital of moral
questions: fundamental fairness. In the existing state of play, the
unchanging or rising magnitude of the unmet needs of the poor for
legal assistance in proceedings involving basic human needs creates
fundamental unfairness of different kinds in several spheres,
especially when combined with the heavily disproportionate
contributions to remedial efforts by members of the Bar. There is
unfairness to poor people. This effect is palpably destructive of
individual lives and of the court system, grounded as it is on the
unrelieved hardships and injustices poor people suffer daily during
imbalanced adversarial judicial proceedings that essentially pit them
against opponents commanding grossly unmatched legal resources.
Fundamental unfairness also implicates the members of the Bar. It
is manifested by the uneven performance of lawyers in fulfilling their
ethical obligation to provide pro bono and public interest legal
service. Those who contribute nothing, the silent majority missing in
action, create an unfairly heavier burden of participation which the
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rest are called upon to bear. This inequality takes on larger
dimension because it could reach a point at which the disproportion
yields deep, counterproductive resentment among those who are left
to carry the brunt of the weight indefinitely. That circumstance could
arise, for instance, in the case of the pro bono contribution required
of law students to fulfill the highest ideals of the profession as a
condition for admission to the Bar. When they become practitioners,
could these young lawyers help but observe that no such obligation
applies to all members of the Bar, and that in fact the silent majority
of lawyers continues to contribute nothing to help narrow the justice
gap? The inherent unfairness some of those newly admitted
attorneys may perceive in that inequality could engender cynicism
that in turn may impede their further contribution of pro bono and
public interest legal service.
Finally, fairness issues stemming from the unmet legal services
needs of the poor permeate throughout other interests encompassed
by the justice system—the parties in court proceedings, the lawyers,
the courts, and the larger society. Judicial proceedings involving
unrepresented litigants impose heavier burdens on all participants.
Those parties face inherently more demanding challenges. They tend
to be disproportionately less educated, less informed, and often less
able to speak or understand English well enough to present a
sufficient case.
For these reasons, lawyers appearing against
unrepresented litigants in some cases could easily take advantage of
their ignorance of the law to induce them into an unfavorable
disposition. Cases involving unrepresented parties are not only more
difficult to adjudicate on the merits, but also to settle, thus prolonging
uncertainty and enlarging costs for other litigants. Largely by reason
of their lack of familiarity with the law, some unrepresented litigants
tend to adopt hard, unrealistic positions that advice of counsel can
usually soften. The judges’ role as impartial arbiters is often strained
in these actions. In efforts to maintain a modicum of balance and
fairness in what are innately lopsided proceedings, the judges are
called upon to grapple with unique challenges. They have to walk the
fine line between preventing injustice to unrepresented parties by
explaining legal principles and offering subtle guidance to them, while
also preserving a proper level of neutrality.

6.

Synthesis

How do the multiple issues and considerations I have outlined tie
together, and what logical, legal, and moral implications emerge from
them? Twenty-five years ago, when the CIALS reached such a point
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of synthesis, it reached the conclusion I described above. It noted
that an official response to the legal services crisis based primarily on
voluntary efforts generated by the organized Bar would be far too
limited, unreliable, short-term, and unfair—and thus morally
unacceptable—to respond adequately to the unmet legal services
needs of the poor, particularly in court proceedings involving basic
human needs. The CIALS therefore recommended that the state
court system impose a pro bono legal service obligation as a condition
for lawyers to remain in good standing as members of the Bar.70
In those days, when I reached this point in talking to some
gatherings of lawyers, I would sense the energy fields in the
auditorium begin to crackle and spark, and the room temperature to
rise. These atmospheric disturbances usually served as the cues for
some in the audience, at least in a figurative sense, to take to the
streets, to uproot the cobblestones and brandish pitchforks, to erect
barriers, shout catcalls, and throw tomatoes. Because in my
assessment of prevailing circumstances I have detected little change in
some of the most vital forces that shape this debate, I hope that at
least in this audience the passage of time has mellowed those
passions.
I hope also that another look at the conditions
unrepresented poor people experience in our courts today will enable
the Bar as a whole to view the facts on the ground with an open mind,
due composure, and greater balance.
CONCLUSION
However the concept is labeled, the pro bono legal service
condition that the CIALS developed twenty-five years ago still exists
out there in suspense, and every bit as pertinent and valid today as it
was then. It remains a weighty option with immense potential to
make a significant difference in narrowing the justice gap. Yet, like
the elephant hiding in the living room, it represents a large presence
many lawyers do not wish to confront or even contemplate.
Nonetheless, my crystal ball tells me that a time could come when
circumstances will render it inevitable for the court system to adopt,
as the CIALS proposed, a pro bono legal service condition applicable
to all attorneys registered in the State. That move might be impelled
by a potential combination of several circumstances on a larger scale
to establish the necessary foundation for a bold response by the court
system. Those conditions include: the continued widening of the
justice gap; the resulting imbalances and greater unfairness that

70. See Marrero et al., supra note 7, at 768.
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characterize lawyers’ disproportionate voluntary contributions; and
the worsening moral crisis these conditions present as they further
weaken our justice system and the legal profession.
The moment I forecast could arise, for example, should the United
States Supreme Court, or the New York Court of Appeals, discarding
the rule of Turner, recognize the existence of a right to representation
of counsel, a civil Gideon, in cases involving basic human needs, such
as court proceedings threatening a party with loss of liberty, home,
food benefits, or parental rights. This prospect is not a pipe dream.
Two observations also recently noted by New York Chief Judge
Lippman71 support its plausibility.
First, only twenty-one years separated Gideon and the decision it
overruled, Betts v. Brady.72
During that interval, the legal
community’s efforts, public and private, mobilized support at the
State and local levels, to provide counsel to indigent defendants, and
to prepare the groundwork for the law to evolve empirically and
conceptually enough to compel the rule of Gideon. Second, through
current legal scholarship,73 as well as through litigation and policy
advocacy, comparable access to justice initiatives are already building
momentum in some states toward recognition of a civil Gideon.74 In a
resolution adopted in 2006, the American Bar Association called for
governments to provide resources to support recognition of a right to
assistance of counsel in civil proceedings involving basic human
needs.75 Similarly, the Conference of State Chief Justices and the
Conference of State Court Administrators urged their members in
2008 to exert leadership to prevent denials of access to justice.76
But until these efforts eventually produce the outcome wished for,
the immense and long-standing unmet demand for civil legal services
for the poor will continue to impair the fair and effective
administration of justice in our courts. In the interim, to mitigate the
crisis, adoption of a pro bono legal service condition for admission to
practice law in New York will become all the more compelling.
Gatherings of interested and concerned audiences, pressing for more

71. See Lippman, supra note 1, at 28.
72. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
73. See generally Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the
Courts in Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31 (2013).
74. See Lippman, supra note 1, at 28. See generally Engler, supra note 73.
75. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION 112A (2006).
76. See generally Resolution 2: In Support of Efforts to Increase Access to
Justice, CONF. CHIEF JUSTICES (July 30, 2008), http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/
Files/CCJ/Resolutions/07302008-In-Support-of-Efforts-to-Increase-Access-toJustice.ashx.
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immediate change, can help ensure that the concept of a pro bono
service condition, such as the one the CIALS proposed twenty-five
years ago, stays relevant in the debate as an available option.

